The vision of ubiquitous computing is becoming a reality thanks to the advent of portable devices and the advances in wireless networking technologies. It aims to facilitate user tasks through seamless utilization of services available in the surrounding environments. In such distributed environments featuring openness, interactions such as service provision and consumption between entities that are unknown or barely known to each other, are commonplace. Trust management through reputation mechanism for facilitating such interactions is recognized as an important element of ubiquitous computing. It is, however, faced by the problems of how to stimulate reputation information sharing and enforce honest recommendation elicitation. We present in this paper an incentive compatible reputation mechanism to facilitate the trustworthiness evaluation of entities in ubiquitous computing environments. It is based on probability theory and supports reputation evolution and propagation. Our reputation mechanism not only shows robustness against lies, but also stimulates honest and active recommendations. The latter is realized by ensuring that active and honest recommenders, compared to inactive or dishonest ones, can obtain the most number of honest (helpful) recommendations and thus suffer the least number of wrong trust decisions, as validated by simulation based evaluation. The proposed reputation mechanism is also implemented as part of a QoS-aware Web service discovery middleware and evaluated regarding its overhead on service discovery latency.
Introduction
Driven by the advent of portable devices (e.g., smartphones) and the advances in wireless networking technologies (e.g., WLAN, GPRS, UMTS), the vision of ubiquitous computing [32] is becoming a reality. It refers to the creation of environments saturated with a spectrum of heterogeneous computing and communication capabilities, which seamlessly integrate with the physical world [30] . It aims to facilitate daily tasks and enhance user productivity through the utilization of those capabilities in an unobtrusive fashion, such that they completely blend in the physical environment and become "invisible".
The heterogeneous capabilities available in the ubiquitous computing environment can be generalized as services, leading to Service oriented Computing (SoC), which is a computing paradigm that utilizes services as fundamental elements for developing applications [26] . A device carried by a user can be a service client, which is an entity in need of services; or a service provider, which is an entity that offers services. SoC fits ubiquitous computing thanks to its minimalist philosophy [31] , i.e., an entity only needs to carry a small amount of codes locally and discover and exploit other services to realize its tasks. A service, a set of functionalities provided by one entity for the use of others [25] , is characterized by its functional and non-functional attributes.
The networking between devices can be through network infrastructure (e.g., a home wireless LAN), which is assumed to be always accessible for nomadic mobile devices. However, it requires deployment and maintenance and cannot assume to be always available. Therefore, in order to achieve "all the time everywhere" access to services in ubiquitous computing environments, it necessitates a more flexible alternative for networking. Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANET) pose as a good choice: mobile devices dynamically establish connections with others when needed [20] . The devices (nodes) are free to move around and the network can be reorganized arbitrarily. In contrast with infrastructured networks, MANETs are deployment-free and realize spontaneous networking of devices. Therefore, they support impromptu interaction between entities, which is a desirable feature for ubiquitous computing [14] . Hence, with MANETs, a user equipped with her device, even when she is moving, can dynamically find and exploit the services available in the surrounding environments, which are not necessarily pre-deployed. In summary, MANET poses as a flexible and suitable underlying networking paradigm for ubiquitous computing environments. Therefore, in this paper, entities are assumed to be connected via ad hoc networks. The terms of device, node and entity are used interchangeably in the rest of this paper.
Overall, the service provision in ubiquitous computing environments has the following characteristics:
-There does not exist any party that is centralized or pretrusted, due to the independence from any infrastructure to allow for more flexible interactions. -The devices exhibit great mobility. This makes nodes ' joining and leaving of a network much more frequent than in traditional wired networks, thus increasing the network's openness. Subsequently, it is very likely for an entity to encounter others, which it has no or very little knowledge of. -Devices can be selfish because providing services consumes resources that are limited. Therefore, services bear prices, which are charged by service providers on clients, in order to enforce cooperation between devices. Different services have different prices depending on factors such as the offered QoS.
Before interacting with a service provider, a client needs to evaluate its trustworthiness, because a dishonest service provider can cheat (e.g., exaggerate its offered QoS) for more revenues. This also applies the other way because a dishonest service client can misbehave as well (e.g., late payment or no payment). For the reason of simplicity, we focus on trustworthiness evaluation of service providers since it applies similarly to service clients. Traditional security mechanisms such as authentication and access control (e.g., X.509 [2] ) fall short for the above purpose because of their reliance on security infrastructure such as Certificate Authority. More importantly, as it is commonplace to interact with strangers in ubiquitous computing environments, even with authentication and authorization services available, authenticating an unknown entity does not provide any access control information. Trust and reputation, on the other hand, can provide protection against such threats. Trust deals with the estimation of a node's future behavior. For example, a client trusts a service provider in that the latter will actually offer the QoS as claimed. Trust is generally difficult to establish between strangers [28] , because they do not have any previous experiences and are not subject to a network of entities informed about their behaviors. Reputation, which is "perception that a node creates through past actions about its intentions and norms" [24] , is important for fostering trust [28] , because it dissuades entities from misbehaving with fear for future revenge. It has been proved to be a useful model and widely deployed in various scenarios such as electronic market places (e.g., eBay 1 ). The reputation assessment of a trusted node, named trustee, by a trusting node, named trustor is dependent on [34] : (i) the trustor's own direct experiences with the trustee; (ii) the trustor's indirect experiences, i.e., recommendations (also named ratings) from other entities. The entities that give recommendations are called recommenders. To prevent loops, recommendations are only based on recommenders' own direct experiences.
Given the openness of the environments, it is very likely that before interacting with an entity, the accumulated direct experiences are too few or too old to derive a trust decision. Recommendations are thus indispensable for alleviating this problem. However, recommendations can be difficult to elicit, i.e., entities are reluctant to recommend. This is because [23] : entities may be reluctant to give positive recommendations because they lift the reputation of the trustees, which are potential competitors; entities may be afraid of retaliation for negative feedbacks; last but not least, the (truthful) recommendations only benefit others. Meanwhile, recommendations are also subject to manipulation and can be false, e.g., colluders give high recommendations for each other. A false recommendation is called a lie. Since truthful recommendations are critical for a reputation mechanism to operate effectively [28] , the two above issues pose obstacles for designing a reputation mechanism that is capable of recognizing the real trustworthiness of an entity.
Existing reputation mechanisms (e.g., [11, 27, 33] ) do not solve the two aforementioned problems altogether. Therefore, we propose a distributed reputation mechanism that motivates entities to recommend truthfully and actively. Our mechanism empowers an entity to distinguish (1) between trustworthy and untrustworthy service providers and (2) between honest and dishonest recommenders. It not only shows robustness against lies, but also stimulates active and truthful recommendations. The latter is achieved by enforcing that honest and active recommenders can benefit more from others, while liars are identified and isolated.
In the rest of the paper, Sect. 2 surveys related work on distributed reputation mechanisms. Section 3 shows the representation of reputation based on Beta distribution. Then we explain how the reputation is formed based on direct and indirect experiences (i.e., recommendations) in Sect. 4. It is followed by reputation evolution in Sect. 5. Then we proceed to present the propagation of reputation and the incentives for active and honest recommendation provision in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, the proposed reputation mechanism is evaluated with respect to its different treatment for recommenders of different honesty and activeness. In Sect. 8, the reputation mechanism is implemented as a module of QoS-aware Web service discovery middleware in ubiquitous computing environments. The prototype is then evaluated regarding the overhead of reputation checking on service discovery latency. This paper finishes with concluding remarks.
Related work
Reputation mechanisms have been widely used and deployed in online service provision (e.g., ebay), peer-to-peer systems (e.g., [12] ) and mobile ad hoc networking (e.g., [22] ). During online service provision, especially e-commerce, it is commonplace for parties that are unknown to each other to interact [28] . This opens up an issue of lack of trust between two parties before an interaction takes place. P2P networks (e.g., Gnutella 2 ) are subject to attacks from anonymous malicious peers, such as virus spreading and fake file attack [12] . In mobile ad hoc networks, since nodes rely on the service of "packet forwarding" provided by their neighbors in order to communicate with others that are out of their communication range, reputation is necessary for evaluating a node's degree of being cooperative (i.e., in forwarding packets). In the following, we survey existing reputation mechanisms, especially focusing on their handling of recommendations.
Some reputation mechanisms do not distinguish between reputation of providing a service and providing a recommendation (e.g., [12] ). They assume that trust on an entity's capability to provide services can be transferred to its opinions. For example, in [12] , a peer that provides authentic files is trusted to give honest opinions. But such assumption makes the reputation system vulnerable to reputation manipulation. For example, a good service provider can exploit it to demote the reputation of its competitors, as its opinions are considered as truthful as its services. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the reputation for providing services and recommendations, namely service reputation (SRep) and recommendation reputation (RRep), respectively. A trustor can evaluate the trustee's overall reputation (ORep) based on its SRep and others' recommendations. The latter is taken into consideration depending on the recommenders' RReps.
In [3] , only negative recommendations are propagated since it is assumed that maliciousness is the exception rather than the norm, such that an entity without any negative experiences is considered honest. This is an optimistic hypothesis because it assumes that any negative experience is well published and known. In [22] , only positive recommendations are taken to prevent the attack of Denial of Service (DoS), i.e., malicious nodes spread negative ratings such that the victim is considered dishonest and deprived of any service (e.g., packet forwarding). The DoS attack can be handled by improving robustness to the false accusations, such that they are identified and ignored. Hence, neither of the above two solutions is well-grounded. Recommendations can be positive or negative and should be equally taken into account for reputation evaluation.
Due to the existence of lies, recommendations need to be carefully incorporated towards the trust decision of whether to interact with a service provider. In other words, a reputation mechanism needs to be able to identify lies such that it is robust against them. Yu and Singh [34] present a reputation model that aims to detect lies in multiple agent systems. Recommendations are compared against the new direct experience to evaluate the recommenders' RReps, which determine the credibility of their recommendations. Only recommendations from helpful nodes (i.e., with high RReps) are accepted and weighed corresponding to their RReps. Similar approach is also taken in [9] . Although they are capable of identifying lies, there is no penalty for either liars or free-riders, which can always benefit from the recommendations of others.
In [4] , recommendations are utilized only as an additional source of information for deriving reputation. A trustor already has its own opinion (SRep) regarding the trustee before asking for any recommendation. Only recommendations that are similar enough to its own opinion are considered truthful and integrated; each accepted recommendation is given a small constant weight. An entity does not keep others' reputation in recommending. Moreover, the authors argue that liars should not be punished as it would discourage honest reporting of misbehavior. But, no incentive is given to encourage recommendation provision.
In [33] , all recommendations are aggregated to derive the public opinion. Each individual recommendation is then compared against the public opinion; large deviation leads the recommendation to be considered false and thus excluded. The public opinion is then recalculated and compared against each remaining recommendation until no more recommendation is filtered out. This kind of approaches to identify lies are endogenous since the truthfulness of recommendations is judged depending on the recommendations themselves. In contrast, exogenous approaches use external factors, such as RRep, for doing so. The implicit assumption underlying endogenous approaches is that the majority of recommendations are honest such that they dominate the lies. Therefore, a recommendation that deviates from the majority is considered a lie. This assumption is not solid in open environments where recommendations can be very few in number, most of which can be untruthful. A variant of endogenous approach is used in [27] , where each entity records all the ratings and subsequent interaction experiences. Assume node a receives a recommendation from recommender r, a first picks out all the entities whom r has recommended with a similar value (e.g., within the range [a. . .b]). The accumulated experiences with those entities are calculated and compared against the rating range to obtain r's RRep. Their approach is exogenous, because it is the accumulated direct experiences that are used to determine the trustworthiness of a recommendation. Meanwhile, it is also endogenous because such comparison is done only within the range of recommendation values that are considered relevant. Jurca and Faltings [11] propose an incentive-compatible reputation mechanism to deal with inactivity and lies. A client buys a recommendation about a service provider from a special broker named R-nodes. After interacting with the provider, the client can sell its feedback to the same R-node, but gets paid only if its report coincides with the next client's report about the same service provider. One issue is that if the recommendation from an R-node is negative such that a client decides to avoid the service provider, the client will not have any feedback to sell. Or in the existence of opportunistic service providers that, for example, behave and misbehave alternatively, an honest feedback does not ensure payback. This opens up the possibility of an honest entity to have negative revenue and thus is unable to buy any recommendation. Besides, the effectiveness of their work depends largely on the integrity of R-nodes, which is assumed to be trusted a priori.
In summary, although current reputation mechanisms are capable of identifying lies, they lack measures to enforce voluntary and honest recommending. Therefore, they are not incentive compatible, i.e., there does not exist any incentive for entities to actively provide honest recommendations. As there is no deterrent for liars, lies can be rampant and honest recommendations can become difficult to acquire due to lack of motivation. Therefore, a distributed reputation mechanism for ubiquitous computing environments not only needs to be robust against lies, but also needs to enforce both active and honest recommendation. In the following, we present such a reputation mechanism, starting with reputation representation.
Reputation representation
Since reputation essentially aggregates past experiences and dynamically evolves, it bears great similarity to Bayesian analysis, which is a statistical procedure that estimates parameters of an underlying distribution based on observations. An extensively used distribution in Bayesian analysis is Beta distribution.
Beta distribution
According to the probability theory, the posterior probability for binary events can be estimated by beta distribution. For example, given a process with two possible outcomes (T , −T ), let r, s be the observed number of T and −T respectively, the Probability density function (PDF) of the probability p of having the outcome T for the next time can be given by beta distribution (with α = r + 1 and β = s + 1):
where α and β are two parameters used to index the continuous family of Beta distribution and B(α, β) is the beta function. f ( p|α, β) represents a probability distribution of p in terms of integrals. Formally, the probability of p falling into
The prior distribution (the initial state) is f ( p|1, 1), leading to uniform distribution ( Fig. 1) . It reflects the fact that without any knowledge, the probability of having T for the next time can be any value between 0 and 1 with equal possibility. New observations are used to update the PDF of p. For example, having observed 8 times f(p|1,1)
Fig. 1 Beta distribution values
T and 2 times −T , the PDF can be expressed as f ( p|9, 3), as plotted in Fig. 1 . The expected (mean) value of the beta distribution f ( p|α, β) assumes a simple form:
It gives the mean value of p, based on (α + β − 2) observations accumulated so far. For example, in Fig. 1 , the expected values of both f ( p|9, 3) and f ( p|21, 7) equal to 0.75. It can be interpreted as that the probability of observing outcome T in the future is uncertain, but the expected value is 0.75. In addition, f ( p|21, 7) has more confidence saying so [i.e., f (0.75|21, 7) > f (0.75|9, 3)], thanks to more accumulated observations.
Beta reputation
As reputation is essentially an a posteriori estimation based on historic experiences (either direct or indirect), beta distribution has been recognized as a useful model to model reputation [4, 10, 24] . Therefore, we represent reputation using beta distribution (abbreviated as beta reputation). A reputation value assumes a tuple of (α, β) (α, β ≥ 1), with α and β representing positive and negative experiences, respectively.
As beta distribution only considers binary events, it is not enough to describe the experiences of service consumption, which can fall into the range between being completely satisfactory and completely unsatisfactory. Therefore, an experience is evaluated with Quality of Experience (QoE), saying, between 0 (completely unsatisfactory) and 1 (completely satisfactory). This experience is split into two parts: QoE contributing to the positive experience and (1 − QoE) to the negative experience. Therefore, beta reputation f ( p|α, β) gives the PDF of the probability of having a complete satisfactory experience, i.e., the expected QoE.
Thanks to the sound statistical properties of beta distribution, beta reputation has the following advantages:
1. It is easy to assess the trustworthiness of an entity with reputation of (α, β), i.e., by calculating α α+β . 2. It is easy to evaluate how many experiences (i.e., α + β − 2) have contributed to the current reputation. The larger this value is, the more probably the reputation assumes the expected value. Only newcomers' reputation is based on 0 experience. 3. It facilitates the combination of experiences from multiple sources, including the trustor itself and different recommenders. This is because the addition of beta reputation is straightforward:
4. It reflects the nature of reputation, which is the aggregation of observations. An entity dynamically adjusts the reputation with more experiences being accumulated, which is similar to deriving posterior distribution after observations are made. 5. It captures the uncertainty of reputation. Beta distribution only gives the PDF of the probability of having an outcome, which matches the fact that reputation can only give probabilistic estimation of an entity's future behavior.
Alternatively, reputation can be also represented with a single value from discrete (e.g., [1] ) or continuous value space (e.g., [21] ). Compared to beta reputation, single-value based reputation representation does not reflect the amount of experiences that contribute to the reputation. In addition, with single value based reputation, ignorance, which refers to the reputation without any knowledge, generally bears the value of 0. It can not be distinguished from the 0 reputation values that result from a mixture of positive and negative experiences (e.g, [21, 24] ). While with beta reputation, only newcomers have a reputation of (1, 1).
Beta distribution's feature of easy experience aggregation facilitates the derivation of an entity's reputation, which is formed based on the trustor's direct experiences and others' recommendations, as explained as follows.
Reputation formation
Before we proceed to show how reputation is formed, we first explain the notations to be used in our reputation mechanism. As reputation is always about an entity o (i.e., trustee) held by some entity a (i.e., trustor), we denote o's reputation from the point of view of a as Rep a (o). Table 1 lists the notations we use, including service reputation (SRep), recommendation (Rec), recommendation reputation (RRep) and overall ORep relies solely on the trustor's direct experiences (i.e., SRep) if they are significant enough to derive a trust decision. This can be judged by checking whether the total accumulated (s p + s n − 2) experiences reach a certain threshold. Otherwise, it asks for recommendations from others. The recommendations and the node's own direct experiences are then combined to evaluate the overall reputation (ORep) of the trustee. Assuming a recommender r gives a recommendation regarding o [i.e., Rec r (o)] to client c and R Rep r (c) = (r p , r n ), the recommendation is considered trustworthy and accepted if (1) r is honest enough, by checking whether r p r p +r n is high enough and (2) the RRep is evaluated based on enough evidences by checking whether (r p +r n −2) is large enough. If the recommendation is taken into account, it is given a weight w r = E(Beta(r p , r n )) = r p r p +r n . The weights of different recommendations are further normalized by dividing with the sum of all weights. Therefore, ORep can be evaluated using SRep and the recommendations from helpful recommenders:
where δ is the weight given to its direct experience (SRep) and is generally greater than 0.5. The favor of direct experiences over recommendations is due to the fact that entities tend to rely on their own experiences more than on others' recommendations [15] . Therefore, an entity can make a trust decision based on the overall reputation (ORep) of the trustee. O Rep is not kept as a field of the acquaintance record, instead it is dynamically evaluated when needed, since it evolves with time and new experiences.
Reputation evolution
An entity can change its behavior over time, making old experiences become irrelevant for the actual reputation evaluation [10, 18] . This calls for discount of past, which gives more weight to recent experiences than old ones. Such discounting also prevents an entity from capitalizing on its previous good behavior forever. Hence, reputation fades with time, as shown in the following texts.
Time fading
Since both recent behaviors and past histories contribute to the reputation, their assigned weights decide how fast the reputation builds up. For example, if recent behavior is assigned a very high weight, a node's reputation tears down very fast after a few misbehaviors. We assign more weight to recent behavior, as suggested by the results of psychological studies in [13] and empirical studies of ebay feedback mechanism [6] . Given the time interval of ∆T , the reputation (α, β) evolves after every ∆T :
where ρ is time fading factor, whose value falls into the range of [0, . . . , 1]. The lower value ρ has, the more quickly histories are forgotten. When ρ equals 0, histories are immediately forgotten; while when ρ equals 1, the history is forever kept and considered equivalent regardless of age.
As shown in the above equations, when ∆T → +∞, ρ ∆T → 0. It expresses the fact that inactivity between two parties for a long time leads to complete discount of experience, making its reputation the same as that of newcomer. This is because the experiences can be too old to be indicative of the trustee's trustworthiness. Both SRep and RRep fade according to the above equations. For simplicity, the reputation value in the rest of this paper does not bear a timestamp and it always refers to the current reputation unless indicated otherwise.
Reputation also evolves with new experiences, as reputation aggregates the overall experiences with an entity. This is reflected in both SRep and RRep, which aggregate the experiences of consuming services and utilizing recommendations, respectively.
Evolution of service reputation (SRep)
Since S Rep(s p , s n ) combines all direct experiences, it is updated whenever a new experience occurs. An experience is described with the metric of Quality of Experience (QoE). As the goal of the reputation mechanism is to identify dishonest service providers that do not comply with their advertised QoS, QoE is accordingly measured based on the QoS conformance of the service provider. More specifically, given n QoS dimensions of d i (i = 1, . . . , n) (e.g., availability, ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) in which p i is the promised value for dimension d i . After the service completes, the QoS that a receives is represented by (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), in which a i is the actual value for dimension d i . The QoE a (o) can be assessed by
where comp(a i , p i ) is a function to calculate one-dimension degree of conformance between the actual and promised QoS. Depending on the QoS dimension, it assumes the following forms: For example, given a service provider's advertisement of (latency = 0.8 ms, availability = 99%), a service client's actual experienced QoS is (latency = 1.0 ms, availability = 100%), then QoE = (M I N (1, 0.8/1.0) + M I N (1, 100%/ 99%))/2 = 0.9.
With a new QoE, the S Rep(s p , s n ) is updated as described in Sect. 3.2: (i) s p = s p + QoE; (ii) s n = s n + (1 − QoE).
Evolution of recommendation reputation (RRep)
Similarly, RRep dynamically evolves with recommendations being elicited and services being consumed. A recommendation bears the form of (c p , c n ), which is equal to SRep for an honest recommender. Given a new QoE of e ∈ [0 . . . 1], the honesty of a recommender is adjusted according to the helpfulness of its recommendation. (4, 2) , ∆e is equal to the size of the shaded area. It is compared against the probability if the trustor has no knowledge about the trustee, i.e., f ( p|1, 1)dp
Therefore, a recommendation with ∆e larger than ∆ min is considered helpful, and unhelpful otherwise. The helpfulness of the recommendation can be evaluated with Assume that before a client c has a new experience (e) of 0.8 with service provider o, it has received recommendations of (2, 4) and (4, 2) from two recommenders a and b respectively. As ∆ min = 0.6 (using Eq. 3), the helpfulness of a's recommendation is e = 0.24 and b's recommendation leads to e = 0.81. It thus enables distinguishing between honest and dishonest recommenders, as well as different degree of honesty or dishonesty.
Based on the features of beta reputation, the value of (r p + r n − 2) is high if an entity is active in providing recommendations; the expected value of f ( p|r p , r n ) is high if an entity is honest in doing so. With two values δ h and δ a defined as threshold trustworthiness and activeness in providing recommendations, a recommender with R Rep(r p , r n ) is considered active if r p + r n − 2 ≥ δ a , and inactive otherwise; it is considered honest if A recommender can move from one state to another, depending on its behavior. An active truth-teller enforces its state by continuing recommending honestly and weakens its state in case of lying. If it continues lying, with the fading of previous good behavior, the accumulated experiences will eventually work against it and degrade it into an active liar. If a recommender has not provided any recommendation for so long a time that its RRep decays, it is considered as an inactive recommender and even a newcomer.
Note that an active and honest recommender can be considered inactive due to the fact that it does not have any direct experience with the trustee being evaluated by the recommendation requester. Therefore, although inactivity can result from an entity's withholding recommendations on purpose, it does not necessarily infer free riding. But in order to motivate a node to become an active truth-teller, active and honest recommenders should be able to have better success in identifying dishonest entities using the reputation mechanism. This is realized during reputation propagation, where different recommenders are treated differently in terms of their accessibility to helpful recommendations.
Reputation propagation
Lack of enough direct experiences triggers a trustor's elicitation of recommendations (e.g., by broadcasting the request) from nearby entities. Note that, such recommendation elicitation only applies to the evaluation of service providers, not recommenders. In other words, RRep relies only on direct experiences of using the recommendations. This is for the purpose of avoiding unlimited loops of reputations, such as reputation of recommending recommenders of service providers or reputation of recommending recommenders of recommenders.
Of all the collected recommendations, only those from truth-tellers (i.e., honest recommenders) are taken into account. If there is no recommendation from any truth-teller, the trustor takes into consideration those from inactive and first-time encountered recommenders by calculating their average. With the recommendations from others, the trustor evaluates the trustee's ORep using Eq. (1). Otherwise, the trustor has to rely on its direct experiences which are too few to make a sound decision. The trust decision will then have to be made depending on other factors, e.g., the trustor's attitude towards strangers. If the trust decision leads to a service consumption and thus a new QoE, the latter is compared against all recommendations to update the recommenders' RReps.
A trustor elicits recommendations indiscriminately but accepts only those from honest recommenders. This is for the purpose of ensuring robustness against lies, while empowering the trustor with the capability of recognizing new recommenders and continuously updating a dishonest recommender's RRep. More specifically, even though the recommendations from liars are not taken into account, they are used to update the RReps of the recommenders, which can be improving if they become honest or deteriorating if they continue lying.
Whenever an honest recommender a receives a request for recommendation regarding an entity o, it first checks whether its direct experiences with o are significant enough for recommending. If that is not the case, a does nothing as it cannot be of any help. Otherwise, i.e., a has enough direct experiences for recommending, it handles the request depending on the state of the recommendation requester:
-If the requester is considered as an active truth-teller, a sends back its S Rep o (a) immediately. -If the requester is considered as an active liar, a simply ignores the request. -If the requester is considered inactive, a gives back its recommendation with a probability depending on diff = δ a − (r p + r n − 2). Inactive recommenders are better treated than liars due to the fact that inactive recommenders do not necessarily withhold their recommendations. To distinguish inactive truth-tellers (IT), newcomers and inactive liars (IL), the IT and IL's probabilities are increased and decreased with an small value of , respectively. Therefore, the less active an entity is, the less possible that it receives helpful recommendations from others. Note that newcomers also suffer from low probability of eliciting honest recommendations.
The reason for honest recommenders going through the above process of treating different type of recommendation requesters differently is that if honest recommenders are over-generous by treating everybody alike, other entities are not motivated to return the favor because doing that does not give them any advantage. Eventually, rational entities choose to withhold their recommendations while liars remain unpunished. Honest recommenders will suffer by having less and less useful recommendations from others and will eventually draw no favor back. Therefore, honest recommenders have to assume the defensive strategy of holding "grudges" against liars by keeping others' RRep in order to guard their own interests. In contrast, dishonest recommenders, i.e., liars, treat all types of recommendation requesters alike since their utmost goal is to spread lies as widely as possible to take advantages such as promoting their colluders' reputation.
The deterrent for nodes to lie thus lies in the consequence of lacking helpful recommendations from honest recommenders, who hold grudges. At the same time, refusing to provide recommendations leads to less accessibility to helpful recommendations. Lack of recommendations forces a trustor's trust decision to be solely dependent on its direct experiences, which often can be too few or old to be helpful in open environments. This causes wrong trust decisions, making the client either interact with dishonest service providers or avoid honest ones. It is more clearly demonstrated in the next section, which evaluates the performance of our reputation mechanism.
Reputation mechanism evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our reputation mechanism in helping nodes distinguish honest and dishonest service providers, and to identify honest and active recommenders, based on simulations.
Experiment setting
The simulation is carried out with Network Simulator (ns-2) with CMU wireless extensions [16] . Our simulated network consists of 40 mobile nodes in an area of 400 m × 400 m, with each node having a transmission range of 100 m. We use the Random Waypoint mobility model with each node moving at walking speed, i.e., between 0.5 m/s and 1.5 m/s, with pause time of 0, i.e., nodes are always in motion. The Distributed coordination function (DCF) of the IEEE 802.11 protocol is used as the MAC layer protocol. The underlying routing protocol is optimized link state routing protocol (OLSR) [5] . The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3 . 
The population of 40 nodes includes 8 types of entities with different behavior in service providing (honest or not), recommendation providing (honesty and activeness), as shown in Table 4 . Each type of entity has the same population, i.e., five each (different settings with different population sizes will also be studied later).
For simplicity without losing generality, we assume that every node can be the service provider for the other. Starting from time 50, 3 for every 1 second, a node makes a trust decision whether to interact with a random node in its routing table, in a round robin way. A trust decision is made as follows: (1) the service client first checks whether the SRep of the service provider is based on enough experiences (threshold δ a = 1.0); (2) if yes, it calculates whether the expected value of SRep reaches a threshold value (δ h = 0.6); (3) if not, it elicits recommendations from its neighbors (we set the request broadcast range to 2 hops). If the aggregation of SRep and others' recommendations are still not enough for making a trust decision, the node decides whether to interact with a service provider with a certain probability. In our experiments, the probability is set to 1.0, assuming an optimistic attitude facing uncertainty.
A total of 60 rounds have been executed. An honest service provider offers a QoE of 0.9, while a dishonest one offers a QoE of 0.1. Honest recommenders recommend with their S Rep(s p , s n ) regarding the trustee, while dishonest recommenders send back lies which are complementary to their SReps, i.e., a recommendation assumes the value of (r p = s n , r n = s p ). Active recommenders offer recommendations with 90% probability, while inactive ones offer with 10% probability.
We investigate and compare the performance of the four different types of recommenders (as shown in Table 5 ): Active truth-teller (nodes of type 1 and 5 in Table 4 ), Inactive truthteller (type 2 + type 6), Active liar (type 3 + type 7) and Inactive Liar (type 4 + type 8). The advantage of being an active truth-teller is reflected in the fact that they can elicit more honest recommendations, which help them make right trust decisions regarding whether to interact with an entity or not. Therefore, we show (1) the number of honest recommendations obtained by the four types of recommenders, respectively. When a client fails to acquire any helpful recommendation, it has to base its trust decision solely on its direct experiences, which are not significant enough for a sound decision. Namely, the client has to make a blind decision. Generally, the more likely an entity elicits honest recommendations, the less blind decisions it needs to make. We thus measure (2) the number of blind decisions made by the four types of nodes, respectively. A blind decision can lead to a mistake, which refers to either a false positive (when an honest service provider is identified as an untrustworthy one) or false negative (when a dishonest service provider is not identified as being so). Thus, (3) the number of mistakes made by different recommenders are also displayed. These metrics are recorded every 200 s to show the evolution of reputation. They are detailed below. Figure 4 shows the number of elicited honest recommendations for different type of recommenders. It can be observed 
Evaluation results

Elicited honest recommendations
Blind decision
Lack of recommendation leads to blind decisions. Figure 5 presents the number of blind decisions for the four types of nodes. Note that during the span of 200 s (which is the interval between snapshots), 200 trust decisions are made, including 50 for each type of recommenders. It can be seen that at the beginning, almost every trust decision for a node is blind due to lack of direct experiences and recommendations. With more accumulated experiences, the nodes make less and less blind decisions. Especially, AT nodes are exposed to the least number of blind decisions (less than 5 after time 1,500 s), while AL nodes suffer by making the most number of them.
Mistakes
Blind decisions can lead to mistakes. Figure 6 presents the number of mistakes made by the four types of recommenders. It can be seen that, at the beginning, every type of node makes mistakes as many as half of the total transaction number. It is because most decisions are blind and honest service providers occupy half of the population.
With more accumulated experiences, every type of recommender makes less and less mistakes. Especially, with the help of honest recommendations, active truth-teller (AT) nodes make the least number of mistakes and active liar (AL) nodes make the most (the order of AT > IT > IL > AL is enforced). Note that dishonest or inactive recommenders can also tell the honesty and activeness of a recommender using reputation system. However, they have access to less number of truthful recommendations for making the right trust decision.
In order to demonstrate more clearly the advantages brought by useful recommendation, the percentages of mistakes out of all transactions for different recommenders are shown in Fig. 7 . It can be seen that, starting from time 1,500 s, ATs make less than 5% of mistakes while ALs suffer more than 20% of mistakes.
Other results
In the above simulations, we have set the population size to be relatively small (40) to lessen the time for bootstrapping (about 1, 500 s for 40 nodes), because nodes need to acquire experiences to be able to give useful recommendations. Basically, a larger population takes longer time to bootstrap, but the reputation mechanism shows similar effects. We did similar simulations with larger population (80) and the percentage of mistakes is shown in Fig. 8 . It can be observed that the order of benefit is established eventually, although it takes more time than in a community of 40 nodes (about 3, 500 s into simulation).
The reputation mechanism also exhibits similar performance with different population percentage of different recommenders. We have carried out the simulations by decreasing the population of AT to 10% and increasing AL to 40%. The percentages of mistakes for different recommenders are presented in Fig. 9 . It shows that the order of the treatment (i.e., AT > IT > IL > AL) is also established.
Reputation-aware web service discovery middleware
The above presented reputation mechanism is integrated as a part of QoS-aware Web service discovery (QoWSD) middleware [17] , which gives an overall solution for discovering Web services in ubiquitous computing environments in a QoS-aware manner. QoWSD provides an operation that allows local service providers to register their services. Meanwhile, clients can discover services, whether local or remote, using an operation provided by QoWSD. servReplies = servLocator.locateServs(); honeServReplies = repManager.identHoneServs(servReplies); bestService = servSelector.select(honServReplies);
The internal structure of QoWSD is presented in Fig. 10 . In brief, 4 as shown in the above pseudocodes, to discover services required by clients, at first the service locator elicits and collects service replies from providers, which are then forwarded to the reputation manager. The latter identifies the service replies from honest service providers and passes them, along with their reputation values, to the service selector. The latter then chooses the best instance on behalf of the client, taking into account the service's QoS values and the service provider's reputation. Lastly, the selected service instance is invoked by the service invoker, which is also reponsible for recording the experienced QoS. This information is used by the reputation manager to update SRep of the corresponding service provider.
We have developed and deployed a prototype implementing QoWSD. In the following, we first give an overview of the prototype in Sect. 8.1. Then in Sect. 8.2, we evaluate the performance of the prototype.
Prototype overview
The prototype is developed using JAVA (J2SE 1.5) and deployed on six laptops with 500 MHz Pentium III CPU, 256 KB of cache and 192 MB of memory, running Linux 2.6.8 (Mandrake 10.1). These machines are believed to be well-suited to estimate the performance of our middleware, as they are almost as powerful as currently portable devices (e.g., the SHARP Zaurus SL-6000 is equipped with Intel Pocket PC is equipped with Intel 520 MHz processor and 64 MB RAM). 5 As shown in Fig. 11 , the local Web services are deployed on Tomcat Server version 4.1.31 6 using Apache AXIS SOAP engine version 1.2.1. 7 They are based on J2SE 1.5 and JVM Tool Interface (JVMTI), 8 which gives an interface for performance profiling. Note that QoWSD middleware is independent of the Web application server and SOAP engine where the local Web services are deployed, because QoWSD interacts with the local Web application server only for invoking Web services through the interfaces which are given by service providers.
The wireless interface is 2.4 GHz DS Lucent IEEE 802.11 Wavelan PC "Silver" of 11 Mbps. The network topology assumes a line as shown in Fig. 12 , for the purpose of setting up the scenarios with different network distances (in hop number) between the service client and provider (from 1 to 5). Each node is connected only to its two neighbors (except the two ends have only one neighbor). Others are disconnected using IP filtering (e.g., iptables 9 ), although they are in the communication range of each other. Therefore, at any point of time, only one node can send any packet, whether a beacon or any other packet as described above. The network is thus more congested than other multihop networks, where packets can be sent simultaneously as long as they are far enough from each other (e.g., 3 hops away). No routing protocol is deployed to avoid different impact from different routing protocols on the service discovery performance. Therefore, the unicast packets are forwarded by the intermediate QoWSD instances. In the following, we evaluate the performance of the prototype regarding the overhead of reputation awareness on service location latency, which is the time between when the client invokes the operation of service discovery and when it receives the reply. The overhead of reputation awareness lies in the time spent by the reputation manager checking the reputation of service providers. It is analyzed as follows.
When the reputation manager looks up the reputation of a service provider, if there exist enough direct experiences with it in the acquaintance table, the reputation checking time is short because it only involves lookup of the table. Otherwise, the reputation manager asks for recommendations from others in the network vicinity. The recommendations are then aggregated after a timeout, which is defined in terms of the length of time (e.g., after 0.5 s). The length of timeout is set according to the waiting time for a recommendation, named recommendation elicitation time (RET). It is defined as the time between when the reputation manager sends a request for recommendations and when it receives one. RET poses as the main overhead of reputation checking time since it involves message transmission between nodes. Figure 13 shows the RET with recommenders at increasing network distances. The reputation-unaware service location latency is also presented for the purpose of comparison. It can be seen that if a service is located within 1 hop, RET within 1 hop increases the latency by 36, 46% for within 2 hops and 88% for within 3 hops. However, if the service is located at further distance (e.g., 3 hops), the overhead brought by RET Fig. 13 Recommendation elicitation time at 1, 2 and 3 hops amounts to only 22, 39 and 53%, respectively. It suggests that to avoid considerable overhead, the recommendation elicitation should be carried out according to the range of service location. More specifically, if the service location is done within close range, the recommendation should be elicited within proximity as well; otherwise, the recommendations can be requested within a broader range.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a distributed reputation mechanism for evaluating the trustworthiness of a service provider in ubiquitous computing environments, including reputation representation, formation, evolution and propagation. Our contribution includes: (1) proposing a simple yet effective reputation mechanism that not only is lie-proof, but also motivates active and truthful recommendation sharing; (2) modeling a reputation that continuous evolves, with time and with new experiences; (3) evaluating the effectiveness and performance of the proposed reputation mechanism via simulation tests; (4) implementating the reputation mechanism as a part of QoS-aware Web service discovery middleware. The proposed reputation mechanism can easily apply to trustworthiness evalaution of service clients-the only difference is reflected in the quality of experience evaluation, which depends on other factors such as timeliness of payment.
As an entity has to handle the reputation independently and autonomously, in our reputation mechanism, it stores the reputation values of all of its acquaintances. This might raise an issue if the population of the acquaintances is so large such that it brings considerable overhead for reputation storage and manipulation. A possible solution is to manage nodes by groups, each of which share a group reputation [24, 29] . The reputation of an entity depends on the group it belongs to; the behavior of a member affects the reputation of its group. This requires strong group support [19] , as the group members need to trust each other and have common interests such that they are motivated to protect the group's reputation.
An interesting aspect of distributed reputation systems relates to the security issue of recommendations. For example, since the recommendations are passed through other entities, their integrity can be in doubt. Therefore, a mechanism to ensure the security of communications between entities is necessary for distributed reputation systems. Another issue worth mentioning is identity changing. Most online reputation systems protect privacy and each agent's identity is normally a pseudonym. It causes problems because pseudonym can be changed easily [24] . When a user ends up having a reputation lower than that of a newcomer, she can discard her initial identity and start from the beginning. This calls for the necessity of special treatments of newcomers. We partly address this issue by putting newcomers in a unfavorable position, such that they have difficulties obtaining helpful recommendations, until they accumulate enough good behavior. But to completely solve this issue, it would have to rely on other mechanisms, such as introducing an "entry fee" for each pseudonym or use of once in a lifetime pseudonym that is bound to a real-world entity [8] . A very related issue is called Sybil attack [7] : if there is no control over creation of new entities, a real-world entity can create as many identities as it wishes to challenge the use of majority in reputation systems. The only challenge this attack can bring to our reputation system is when there is no recommendation from an active truth-teller, the trustor relies on the average of all recommendations from unknown (or barely known) recommenders. The addressing of these challenges will be part of future work.
